The Western Roads Upgrade

The $1.8 billion Western Roads Upgrade project was launched in 2018 and completed in 2021.

And included upgrades to eight arterial roads in Melbourne’s west.

Massive new intersections.

And the resurfacing of 260 km of existing roads between Footscray to Werribee.

So why haven’t these roads fallen apart in the years that have followed?

It’s because the upgrade was delivered part of a convoluted public–private partnership between the Department of Transport and Planning and a private consortium called ‘Netflow’, which sees the government give them buckets of money for the next 20 years to maintain the road, with a compliance regime that will penalise them for as little as a pothole.

To manage these contractual obligations, you need data – so the Netflow consortium has a fleet of inspection vehicles continually doing laps of the western suburbs.

Covered in LiDAR sensors looking for faults in the road surface.

And maintenance crews in ‘Western Roads Upgrade’ branded vans ready to swoop in and fix faults ASAP.

Their marketing blurb describing it as:

Netflow is transforming the way road maintenance is performed in Victoria, using real-time data on the condition of the network to employ maintenance strategies that minimise disruption and maximise whole-of-life value.

This more efficient maintenance program is resulting in an average of one road per week being resurfaced.

The core of Netflow’s whole-of-life maintenance solution is the central Network Delivery Hub.

The 24/7 hub monitors the performance of the network in real time, providing a seamless interface with the Department of Transport, local councils and other third parties to implement dynamic-scheduled works, keep communities informed, predict and prevent issues, and coordinate timely responses to incidents.

The use of vehicle-mounted street scanning technology, drones, 3D modelling and physical inspections allow Netflow to schedule preventative maintenance and reduce road closures.

This whole-of-life approach provides best-in-class maintenance of the road network at a lower cost.

Meanwhile for every other road in Victoria, the government just keeps kicking the can down the road, because they aren’t accountable to anyone.

So why not keep doing it

If the Western Roads Upgrade project was so successful in getting rid of potholes, why doesn’t the government do more upgrades like this? Turns out the private companies behind it lost money by underbidding.

The Andrews government’s $1.8 billion Western Roads Upgrade has stalled after a key subcontractor walked off the job with just $920 remaining in its accounts, leaving other subcontractors millions of dollars out of pocket.

The Sunday Age can also reveal the head contractor on the project, South-African headquartered and Perth-based WBHO, has reported $133 million in losses after it admitted to under-bidding to win the work, and its executive chairman, Louwtjie Nel, conceded the project was the company’s “biggest error in 50 years”.

WBHO’s main subcontractor, little known western suburbs-based civil engineering firm Civilink, quit in August and has gone into liquidation, owing creditors at least $13 million.

And so the tender process on the South Eastern Roads Upgrade Project and Northern Roads Upgrade Project were terminated in July 2020 – replaced by the $2.2 billion Suburban Roads Upgrade to be delivered as 12 individual projects by a pre-qualified panel in an approach modelled on the Level Crossing Removal Project.

Footnote: digging into the legalese

The full details of the public–private partnership can be found in the “Outer Suburban Arterial Roads Program – Western Package” Project Deed.

For a start, look at the corporate structure.

Minister for Roads and Road Safety on behalf of the Crown in right of
the State of Victoria
(State)

Netflow OSARS (Western) Pty Ltd as trustee for Netflow OSARS (Western) Unit Trust for and on behalf of the Netflow OSARS (Western) Partnership and Cintra OSARS (Western) Pty Ltd as trustee for Cintra OSARS (Western) Unit Trust for and on behalf of the Netflow OSARS (Western) Partnership (Project Co)

And it’s contractors, investors and financiers all the way down.

D&C contractor

The D&C contractor is WBHO Infrastructure Pty Ltd. Project Co has appointed the D&C contractor to design and construct the eight Arterial Road Upgrades and the Initial Rehabilitation Works.

Significant subcontractors

The D&C contractor has appointed the following significant subcontractors to deliver elements of the Arterial Road Upgrades:
• Ace Infrastructure Pty Ltd;
• Civilex Victoria Pty Ltd; and
• Winslow Constructors Pty Ltd

Contracts with other subcontractors are expected to be executed shortly.

Equity investors

The following entities have committed to provide the equity required for Project Co:
• Plenary Investments (Western OSARS) Pty Ltd
• Cintra OSARs Western Ltd

Financiers (long term)

The following entities have provided the long term debt required for the Project:
• DB Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
• Pensionskasse Des Bundes Publica
• Samsung IFM Global Infrastructure Debt Professional Investment Private Investment Trust No. 1
• Manulife Asset Management (Hong Kong) Limited
• Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America

Financiers (short term)
The following entities have committed to provide the short term debt required for the Project:
• Westpac Banking Corporation
• Bank of China Limited
• Mizuho Bank, Ltd
• Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited

VicRoads gives this as their justification for completing the upgrade as a public–private partnership.

A range of procurement options that are typically considered for high-value road construction projects were assessed based on their suitability and value for money drivers in reference to the specific characteristics of the Western Roads Upgrade. The following four procurement options were shortlisted on the basis that they represented models currently in use and have a history of utilisation by VicRoads or other State agencies:

• design and construct;
• alliance;
• design, build and maintain; and
• design, build, finance and maintenance (availability-based PPP).

Following a procurement options assessment of the shortlisted procurement options, the availability based PPP delivery model was the highest ranked procurement option. This option was recommended, and subsequently approved by the State, for delivery of the Project.

The key considerations in recommending an availability-based PPP model are summarised below.

• The model provides increased opportunity for the State to harness private sector innovation and structure a contract that incentivises whole-of-life efficiencies to arterial road investment.
• The bundling of construction and maintenance tasks under a long-term agreement (subject to vigorous competition) can drive efficiency in delivery and asset management. Introducing private finance also provides additional discipline and scrutiny of risk (for example, financier due diligence and oversight). The PPP model can also be expected to deliver improved and more consistent road asset conditions under a PPP commercial structure involving an appropriate KPI and abatement regime.
• On a ‘whole-of-life’ cost comparison basis, PPPs have been documented to deliver better value for money outcomes as compared to traditional contracting delivery methods (separate, unbundled contracts) and have been successfully deployed across a range of sectors (including roads) in Victoria. These benefits are not only limited to cost savings but also include improved and more consistent road asset conditions. A focus on longer term, ‘whole-of-life’ contracting also incentives private sector innovation in terms of how best to maintain the asset over the term in the most cost effective and efficient manner.

Prior to the release of an invitation for EOI, a market sounding of the relevant industry, including sponsors, contractors, road maintenance providers and financiers, was undertaken. The feedback from this process supported the State’s selection of a PPP model to deliver the Project and achieve the State’s objectives.

Along with a calculation of the ‘Public Sector Comparator’ that they used to argue that a PPP saved the government money.

The Public Sector Comparator is an estimate of the hypothetical, risk adjusted, whole-of-life cost of the Project if delivered by the State. The PSC is developed in accordance with the output specification and risk allocation proposed for the private sector party arrangement and is based on the most likely and efficient form of conventional (that is, non-PPP) delivery by the State.

The PSC is expressed in terms of the net present cost (NPC) to the State, calculated using a discounted cash flow method taking full account of the costs and risks that would arise through State delivery. The PSC includes amounts for the design and construction of Arterial Road Upgrades and Initial Rehabilitation Works, as well as maintenance and lifecycle and other costs during the Maintenance Phase of the Project.

The PSC is made up of a number of elements as contained in Table 7.

Components of the PSC	NPC ($millions)
Arterial Road Upgrades and Initial Rehabilitation Works (construction costs)	$ 622
Maintenance and lifecycle costs	$ 438
Raw PSC	$ 1,060
Transferred risk	$ 100
Proposal Comparable PSC	$ 1,160

The quantitative value for money assessment, as demonstrated by the estimated savings between the Proposal Comparable PSC and the final Proposal is shown in Table 8.

Public Sector Comparator (NPC – $millions)	$ 1,160
Final Proposal (NPC– $millions)	$ 1,133
Estimated savings (%)	2.3%

Something much easier to understand is the scope – divided up into three objectives:

Arterial Road Upgrades (ARU)

The design, construction and financing of eight ARUs in Melbourne’s west during the Initial Phase, consisting of:

• The duplication of Dunnings Road between Point Cook Road and Palmers Road and the duplication of Palmers Road between Dunnings Road and Overton Road;
• The duplication of Palmers Road between Overton Road and Boundary Road and Robinsons Road between Boundary Road and the Western Freeway including the realignment of Palmers Road across Sayers Road;
• The duplication of Derrimut Road between Sayers Road and Dohertys Road;
• The duplication of Leakes Road between Fitzgerald Road and Derrimut Road;
• The duplication of Dohertys Road between Fitzgerald Road and Grieve Parade;
• The duplication of Dohertys Road between Foundation Road and Palmers Road;
• The duplication of Forsyth Road between Old Geelong Road and Wallace Avenue, including the re-alignment of Forsyth Road and Old Geelong Road; and
• The replacement of the existing Duncans Road Bridge over the Princes Freeway West and the addition of westerly (or Geelong) orientated ramps.

Initial Rehabilitation Works

Improvement works on road pavements and structures within the Maintenance Network during the Initial Phase to meet service standards.

Maintenance Services

Delivery of maintenance and lifecycle services (routine and periodic) within the Maintenance Network during the Maintenance Phase.

As are the key performance indicators Project Co is required to meet.

The KPIs set out in the KPI Summary of this Annexure B are separated into 7 categories, being:
1. Inspections;
2. Response;
3. Compliance;
4. Pavement performance;
5. Structures performance;
6. Reporting; and
7. Safety.

Which then explodes into an enormous level of detail regarding the Project Scope and Delivery Requirements (PSDR).

1.1 Hazard Inspection
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that safety inspections are carried out in accordance with the safety inspections requirements set out in the Code of Maintenance Standards.

1.2 Defect Inspection
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that inspections are carried out in accordance with the defect inspections requirements set out in the Code of Maintenance Standards.

1.3 Structure Condition Inspection
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that inspections are carried out in accordance with the condition inspections requirements set out in section 8.2(b)(i)(B) of Part F7 and section 8.3(b)(ii) of Part F7 of the PSDR and the Code of Maintenance Standards.

2.1 Hazard Response
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that the hazard response, from the time Project Co identifies a hazard by inspection or receives notification from the State or VicRoads of a hazard to the time the hazard is rectified by Project Co, is compliant with the requirements set out in the Code of Maintenance Standards.

2.2 Defect Response
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that the Defect response, from the time Project Co identifies a Defect by inspection or receives notification from the State or VicRoads of a Category A and/or a Category B Defect to the time the Defect is rectified by Project Co.

2.3 Emergency Response
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that the emergency response, from the time Project Co receives notification from the State or VicRoads of an Emergency Event to the time the Emergency Event is responded to by Project Co.

3.1 Code of Maintenance Standards
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that all activities (to the extent not already captured under KPI items 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) set out in the Code of Maintenance Standards, under items RM411 to RM416 and RM611 to 613 and RM 615 identified in the Table 750.H11 -Routine Maintenance Intervention Criteria and Response are completed in accordance with the requirements set out in the section 7 of Part F7 of the PSDR.

3.2 Forecast Maintenance and Refurbishment Plan
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that all activities set out in the Forecast Maintenance and Refurbishment Plan are completed in accordance with that plan (as updated and reviewed by the State in accordance with the Review Procedures on an annual basis to reflect the condition monitoring of Project Assets).

3.3 Communications and Community Relations Plan During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure that all activities set out in the Communications and Community Relations Plan are completed in accordance with that plan.

And into the gory details of road surface quality.

4.1 Roughness – Network based
During the Maintenance Phase (Initial), Project Co must ensure roughness limits set out in section 8.2(a)(ii) of Part F7 of the PSDR, are as a minimum achieved for pavement on the Project Roads.

4.2 Rutting – Network based
During the Maintenance Phase (Initial), Project Co must ensure rutting limits set out in section 8.2(a)(iii) of Part F7 of the PSDR, are as a minimum achieved for pavement on the Project Roads.

4.2.1 Rutting – Pavement Reporting Section based
During the Maintenance Phase (Full) an individual KPI Incident will occur for each 100m lane section of any Pavement Reporting Section failing to meet these requirements as set out in section 8.3(a)(iii)(B) of Part F7 of the PSDR.

5.1 Structures Performance
During the Maintenance Phase (Initial) in relation only to Existing Structural Assets, Project Co must ensure that Existing Structural Assets are operating at their designed load, speed, and availability levels with no restrictions applied, in accordance with the requirements set out in section 8.2(b)(i)(A) of Part F7 of the PSDR.

Submitting paperwork.

6.1 Asset Management System Availability
During the Maintenance Phase, Project Co must ensure the Asset Management System is available to the State and VicRoads, in accordance with the requirements set out in section 1 of Part D of the PSDR.

7.1 General Reporting
During the Initial Phase, Project Co must submit Monthly Development Phase Progress Reports and the Monthly Maintenance Phase Performance Reports in accordance with the Deed.

And finally – Safety.

8.1 Safety
During the Initial Phase and Maintenance Phase, an individual Safety KPI Incident is an Event for incidents which result in a Lost Time Injury (LTI), Total and Permanent Disability or Fatality to any employee, or contractor, or consultant of Project Co or its contractors or sub-contractors in connection with the performance of the Services or Works.

at least they’ve created a lot of email jobs along the way.

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On the downstream side is the original 1936 bridge, with art deco-styled decorative parapets, pillars, and light fittings.

And beside it a far more utilitarian concrete bridge completed in 1992.

In the beginning

Lynch’s Bridge was an early crossing place on the Maribyrnong River for those headed west of Melbourne, with owner of the neighbouring Pioneer Hotel, Michael Lynch, operating a punt on the site from 1849. A competing crossing was operated by Joseph Raleigh at Maribyrnong, which replaced his punt with a bridge in 1858.

SLV photo IAN20/12/66/4

And so in 1863 Michael Lynch petitioned the government for permission to replace his punt with a pontoon bridge, provided he was granted a half acre of land on the eastern bank of the river for the abutments and approaches.

Members of the Essendon and Flemington Council not in favour of private bridges, and the matter was debated, with one local resident questioning the motives of Lynch.

In September 1864 a motion was passed to prohibit Lynch from building a bridge, but it soon rescinded, with the new bridge in use for Melbourne Cup Day 1864.

‘Flemington Racecourse from the Footscray side of Salt Water River, Victoria ‘ by J Ryan

Local residents found the toll gate a nuisance, but Lynch talked up his bridge, telling Western District sheep and cattle owners they only needed to pay a single toll if headed to the sheep and cattle yards on the opposite bank.

As a result in 1866 the Essendon and Flemington Council proposed purchasing Mr Lynch’s bridge, as did the Footscray Council in 1867. However it took until in 1882 for the bridge to be brought under public ownership, the Footscray Council abolished the toll and requesting the Commissioner of Public Works pay the reminder of the loan.

A replacement bridge

However that was not the end of the saga – in October 1901 Lynch’s Bridge was closed by the Public Works Department due to it falling into disrepair, and a Mr J. Byers erected a pontoon bridge beside it to carry traffic to Flemington Racecourse, for a “small toll” of one penny. The debate as to who should fund the cost of a new bridge continued in the months that followed, with a tender finally awarded in December 1902 – eighteen months since the bridge was closed.

MMBW plan 781

The new bridge opened without ceremony in May 1903, after contractors finished their work and left it open for traffic, with members of the Flemington and Kensington Council holding an official opening a few days later, without the involvement of the Footscray Council who also funded it.

SLV photo H2151

The new bridge was built of timber, and had a lifting span in the middle, which sometimes caused delays to river traffic, and had high ongoing running costs.

Haven’t we been here before?

September 1929 was a familiar event – Lynch’s Bridge closed after being declared unsafe for traffic, reopening after temporary repairs were completed over a three week period.

The Footscray Council and the City of Melbourne then considered a number of options for a permanent crossing – a new five span reinforced concrete bridge for £38,750, a new three span steel bridge for £35,900, or extending the life for the existing bridge for five years for £2,250. The Footscray Council objected having to fund half the cost of a new bridge, delaying the start of construction, with an agreement finally reached in January 1936 for the Country Roads Board to pay half the cost of the project.

Opened in 1939, the new Lynch’s Bridge was built on a different angle to the timber bridge it replaced, allowing Ballarat Road to be realigned to meet Smithfield Road, eliminating a dangerous curve on the Footscray side. The Footscray Council suggested naming the new bridge ‘Gent’s Bridge’ after the Town Clerk of Footscray, but it came to nothing.

Traffic troubles

As Melbourne grew, the amount of traffic using Lynch’s Bridge grew – 43,000 vehicles per day using it in 1989, half the volume that used the West Gate Bridge. And the area became known as a blackspot for motor vehicle crashes, with the 1985-88 period seeing 79 separate incidents, including 16 head-on collisions, and nine deaths.

The Age, 23 November 1989

Leading in November 1989 to a coronial inquest being opened into a number of recent fatalities at the site.

Excessive speed was the main cause of car accidents on Lynch’s Bridge in Kensington, an inquest on three deaths on the bridge was told yesterday.

Sergeant Noel Osborne, of the accident Investigation section at Brunswick, said that despite measures to make the four-lane bridge safer, most vehicles approached it too fast. 

The deputy state coroner, Mr Graeme Johnstone, is holding joint inquests on Kevin John Lewis, 35, of Broadmeadows, and Emily Jane Stonehouse, 4, of Werribee, who were killed in an accident on 23 October 1988, and Matthew James Simmons, 25, of Box Hill, who died in an accident on 14 February this year.

Lynch’s Bridge crosses the Maribyrnong River near Flemington Racecourse. The approach from Footscray, on Ballarat Road, has three lanes that narrow to two before a sharp left-hand bend on to the bridge. The Smithfield Road approach, from Flemington, is two lanes.

Sergeant Osborne, asked by Mr Johnstone to suggest safety measures, said that even if the Ballarat Road approach was narrowed to one lane in an effort to slow traffic, he believed many drivers would still try to take the bend too fast. He said the answer was to duplicate the bridge.

“That in my mind is the answer. We certainly would not be having the head-ons as we are now. The number of people killed at this location has caused me great concern. It appears that not a great deal has been done.”

Mr John Connell, of the Roads Corporation, said speed cameras had shown that more than 70 per cent of vehicles approaching the bridge on Ballarat Road travelled faster than the 60 kmh speed limit. The fastest speed had been 139 kmh despite signs recommending 55 kmh.

Peter James McDonald, a truck driver from Maidstone who crosses Lynch’s Bridge regularly, said that at the time of the accident involving Mr Simmons, the camber of the road pulled vehicles to the right as they turned left on to the bridge from Ballarat Road. The inquiry is continuing

The inquest heard that duplication of the bridge had been proposed in 1975, with the cost in 1989 money estimated to be $3 million.

In his findings to the 1989 inquest, Coroner Graeme Johnstone noted that the 1938 bridge was not unsuitable for the volume and speed of traffic passing over it, recommending that the Ballarat Road approach to the bridge be restructured so that the three-to-two lane merge is further from the sharp bend onto the bridge, and that the VicRoads make duplication of the bridge a priority in their road improvement program.

As a result, a duplicate bridge on the upstream side of original bridge was completed in 1992, allowing the 1936 bridge to be dedicated to westbound traffic.

The duplication of Lynch’s Bridge and road approaches at Flemington was opened to traffic in April 1992 and has eliminated one of Melbourne’s worst accident blackspots. In accordance with a Coronial Inquiry recommendation to fast track the works, new technology for bridgeworks and roadworks construction was used. Road approaches over poor ground conditions utilised polystyrene as lightweight fill – a first for VicRoads and Australia. The method reduces road settlements to manageable levels and achieves cost savings over more conventional alternatives. The project was completed in June 1992 at a cost of $5.5million.

And finally – another upgrade

In August 2019 it was announced that Lynch’s Bridge would be upgraded as part of the Western Road Upgrade public–private partnership.

A National Trust-listed bridge which was once the main gateway to Melbourne’s west will be upgraded this week as part of the Victorian Government’s Suburban Roads Upgrade.

Member for Footscray Katie Hall today announced the start of important work to rehabilitate the Ballarat Road Bridge, under the $1.8 billion Western Roads Upgrade.

The crossings over the Maribyrnong River are steeped in history, with the outbound Lynch’s Bridge built in 1936 and heritage listed for its “historical and technical significance” by the National Trust in 2005. Millions of Victorians and visitors would have crossed this bridge in some form.

Lynch’s Bridge also holds technical engineering significance, as one of the first steel and concrete crossings designed so the reinforced concrete deck works together with the steel beams.

The historic five-span bridge sits alongside its more modern counterpart known as the Smithfield Bridge, which was built in 1990.

The 108-metre bridges will undergo work to strengthen them for the future for up to 45,000 vehicles which travel over them every day.

It is anticipated they’ll be used by up to 50,000 cars and trucks daily by 2031.

The art-deco style of Lynch’s Bridge will be preserved as safety barriers are upgraded on both bridges, and footpaths and drainage will also be improved.

There will be some lane closures in place as this work is underway to ensure road crews can work safely and quickly.

Work included.

– removed old barriers and replaced them with new safety barriers
– installed cathodic corrosion protection to protect the metal bridge supports from rust and deterioration
– resurfaced the road on the bridges and on approach to the bridges
– removed features no longer needed such as broken lights.

You had to look close to see the changes.

Major Roads Project Victoria photo

But the big new crash barriers are easy to see when driving past.

But one thing that is obvious is the focus on motor vehicles, not active transport.

The bridge has enough space for a grass median strip!

Yet pedestrians are forced into a narrow footpath.

And cyclists are given a narrow strip of asphalt, centimetres from passing vehicles.

Pretty crap upgrade, isn’t it?

Footnote: water under the bridge

When I visited Lynch’s Bridge in December 2020, I noticed these new looking steel additions to the piers of the 1992 bridge.

My initial thought was strengthening work linked to the Western Road Upgrade project, but turns out I was wrong – it’s actually linked to the West Gate “Tunnel” Project.

West Gate Tunnel Project photo

A post on their Facebook page dated 11 November 2021 mentioning the work.

West Gate Tunnel Project crews have started working on modifications to streamline the piers on the Smithfield Road Bridge.
These works will help during high flows in Maribyrnong River and mitigate flooding once our new Maribyrnong River bridge is built. Gaps between the columns will be filled with concrete to create a wall type pier with rounding at both ends.

The works required to compensate for new piers in the Maribyrnong River at Footscray.

West Gate Tunnel Project photo

Forming part of the elevated roadway between Footscray Road and the actual West Gate “Tunnel”.

West Gate Tunnel Project photo

And the work at Lynch’s Bridge seems to have flown under the radar – the only other mention of it I could find was a single line in the West Gate Tunnel Project “Final Report for Submission to the Minister for Planning” for March 2019 to August 2019.

Flood mitigation works completed at Smithfield Bridge

I wonder what difference these works made to the October 2022 Maribyrnong River flood?

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